[Citing Mishnah Shekalim 7:7] “[The court enacted an ordinance] regarding the Red Heifer that one is not liable for appropriating consecrated property for making use of its ashes.” Isn’t this already a Torah law? For it is taught, It is a sin offering (Numbers 19:9), which teaches [that like a sin offering,] one is liable for appropriating consecrated property. “It” [means deriving benefit from the animal itself]. But from its ashes, [if one derives benefit,] one is not liable for appropriating consecrated property. Rav Ashi said: There were two ordinances [enacted concerning this matter]. According to Torah law, “it” means one is liable for me’ilah (appropriating consecrated property) [from deriving benefit from “it,” the animal itself], but from its ashes, one is not liable for me’ilah (appropriating consecrated property). But when they [the Rabbis] saw that people were treating [the ashes] disrespectfully—by making [salves] for their wounds from it—they decreed [use of the ashes to be] me’ilah (appropriating consecrated property). But when they saw that [due to this decree] people were refraining from sprinklings [in cases that were somewhat] uncertain, they restored the biblical law.
INTRODUCTION
This is a technical and recondite passage, but what lies behind it is worth working to understand. First: Me’ilah is a trespass whereby one uses, or derives benefit from, something consecrated to God. In essence, me’ilah, appropriating consecrated property, means stealing what belongs to God’s. That includes all animals brought for sacrifice. But the Red Heifer is not a sacrifice in the usual sense: it is slaughtered and burned outside the Temple precinct. Its ashes are gathered and used for purification from the most severe level of ritual impurity—contact with a corpse. The Red Heifer is not a sacrificial animal. Nonetheless, Torah calls it a chatat (“sin offering,” Numbers 19:9), Talmud (Yoma 42a) compares its sanctity to utensils used in the upkeep of the Temple because it was purchased from Temple fund. Therefore it is subject to the laws of me’ilah.
Next: The mishnah of Menachot that precedes the discussion above discusses how to handle the expense of the High Priest’s minchah (the daily meal offering he made ) during an “interregnum” period between the death of one High Priest and the appointment of his successor. The Rabbis enacted several ordinances that differed from Torah law to resolve issues that arose. Just prior to the passage above, a double enactment was cited. According to Torah law, the High Priest paid for his minchah. If he died, these meal offerings were purchased with Temple funds until another High Priest assumed the office. However, when the Temple treasury grew depleted, the Rabbis ordained that payment for these offerings should be sought from the deceased High Priest’s heirs, thereby overriding Torah law. That did not work as planned, however, because the heirs were negligent and did not bring the offerings, so the Rabbis issued a second ordinance revoked the first and once again operated by Torah law. This account inspires the recounting of another two-ordinance situation.
COMMENTARY
The mishnah cited (from tractate Shekalim) says that a human court decreed that one who makes use of the ashes of the Red Heifer is not subject to the laws of me’ilah: the ashes, unlike the animal itself, are not considered God’s property. Gemara asks: Why was this necessary? Doesn’t Torah already say as much in Numbers 19:9 when it declares the Red Heifer to be a chatat (“it is a sin offering”)? A baraita teaches that “it” in Numbers 19:9 refers only to the animal, but not to its ashes after it is burned. We might stop a moment and ask how this applies to sacrificial animals. Those which are burned on the altar remain there until they are turned completely to ash, after which young apprentice priests clean away the ashes. While the task of cleaning away the ashes is part of the priests’ sacred duties, the ashes themselves are not subject to the laws of me’ilah because, as Talmud explains elsewhere, once the mitzvah has been performed with an object (such as an animal offered for sacrifice), it is no longer subject to me’ilah (Sukkah 49b).
Rav Ashi now explains that there were, in fact, two decrees. Biblically, me’ilah applies only to the animal and not to its ashes after it is burned (as Gemara already explained). But in time, the Sages observed that people treating the ashes in a disrespectful manner, using them to produce salves to treat wounds, perhaps because they thought the ashes were not subject to me’ilah. This inspired the Rabbis to pass the FIRST DECREE: the ashes of the Red Heifer were thereafter subject to the laws of me’ilah and its penalty of paying restitution. As a result of this decree, the Sages subsequently observed that people who were doubtfully in need of ritual purification with the ashes of the Red Heifer held back and did not secure the priest-administered ritual purification, most likely because they thought that if they didn’t actually need it, they would be committing me’ilah—using God’s Red Heifer ashes for their own benefit when it was not truly required. Both the Torah and Rabbis considered ritual purity to be of paramount importance. Therefore, to prevent this far more serious problem, the Rabbis subsequently initiated a SECOND DECREE: that the original Torah standards concerning the ashes should again prevail and ashes would no longer be subject to the laws of me’ilah.
QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER AND DISCUSS
- Why might people have ascribed healing power to the ashes?
- Why might the Rabbis have considered the salves made from Red Heifer ashes to be a disrespectful use of the ashes?
- The Rabbis’ first decree is more restrictive than biblical law, but as if in compliance with the Law of Unintended Consequences, the unpredictable results are worse. Torah’s law addressed the status of the ashes, but the Rabbis’ decree was an attempt at social engineering. What are the ups and downs of using laws to engineer behavior?
