Uh oh! Got that One Wrong! — BT Horayot 6b — #36

If a High Priest] ruled [erroneously] unintentionally and acted [in accordance with his errant ruling] unintentionally, he brings a bull [as a chatat (sin offering)].  

This is obvious! Abaye said: What are we dealing with here?  

Consider a hypothetical case in which [a High Priest] ruled and afterward forgot the reason for his ruling, and at that time he erred and said, “I hereby act on the basis of my [previous] ruling.” You might have said that since had he known [his reason for the original ruling] he would have retracted, he is considered as one who acted intentionally and is not liable [to bring a chatat].  

Learn from this [why the mishnah tells us he is liable to bring a chatat].

INTRODUCTION

The tractate Horayot discusses errors in rulings made by the High Priest or the Sanhedrin that. Horayot concerns leniencies that cause people to violate negative (“thou shalt not…”) commandments serious enough to carry the punishment of karet (being cut off from the Jewish people) if committed purposefully. Given the priest’s or judge’s authority and influence, we can easily see why the first mishnah in Pirkei Avot reminds sages to, Be deliberate in judgment. But, as Rambam (Moses Maimonides) pointed out, “it is impossible for those with the nature of flesh and blood not to err”—or put another way: nobody’s perfect, not even a High Priest or members of the Sanhedrin.

Although the most egregious violations of negative commandments carry the penalty of karet (excision from the community), there is a remedy if the sin were committed inadvertently: the person must bring a chatat (sin) offering to make expiation.

Before explaining the passage above, we need to understand the mishnah to which our passage is responding. Let’s try to understand it first.

If a High Priest ruled [erroneously] unintentionally and acted [in accordance with the errant ruling] unintentionally, he brings a bull [as a chatat/sin offering]. If [he ruled] unintentionally but acted intentionally, or if [he ruled] intentionally and acted unintentionally, he is exempt [from bringing a chatat] because the law of the High Priest's ruling [that he makes] for himself is like a court’s ruling [that it makes] for the community. (M Horayot 2:1)

The mishnah recognizes three cases: (1) A High Priest rules erroneously without realizing that he is wrong, and subsequently acts on his own ruling. (2) A High Priest rules erroneously without realizing he is wrong, subsequently realizes his mistake, but acts in accord with the erroneous ruling nonetheless. (3) A High Priest intentionally rules incorrectly and then acts on his own ruling but without intention to act on it at the time he did. In the first case, the High Priest can remedy the situation by bringing a chatat (sin offering), which Torah stipulates is brought for inadvertent sin (Leviticus 4:27). In the second and third cases, however, the remedy of the chatat is not available to him because of the intentional character of either his decision or his acting on the decision, and because the law follows the procedure for the case of erroneous rulings brought by the Sanhedrin.

COMMENTARY

If your head is spinning, please hang on a little longer. The mishnah tells us that only in the case in which the High Priest’s erroneous ruling was unintentional and his acting on it was also unintentional, he brings a bull as a chatat to remedy the situation. Gemara says: Obviously! We know this from Leviticus 4:3 and 27, so why does the mishnah bother telling us what is obvious? Abaye explains that the mishnah articulates what seems to be an obvious case because it wants us to be aware of particular variation of the case that we might misconstrue: A High Priest makes an erroneously ruling, and subsequently forgets his own reasoning. When it comes time to act on the ruling, he relies on it although he has forgotten the reasoning. We might think, Abaye says, that had he recalled his original reasoning, he would have had the opportunity to revisit his thinking and possibly correct his error. But he didn’t; he went ahead and acted on the ruling without knowing the reasoning behind it. We might think, Abaye says, that this means his sin is intentional, but it is not, and that is why the mishnah states the “obvious”—to insure that we don’t misconstrue this case.

Even with the best of intentions, people make mistakes. Any human system needs to make reasonable allowances for human error. But when are errors forgivable (the function of the chatat offering is to clear the one who brings it of guilt, but it only applies for inadvertent violations) and when are they so egregious that we ought not excuse them?

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER AND DISCUSS

1. Do you agree with Abaye’s analysis of this borderline case? We might say: The High Priest did not realize he had made an errant decision. Or, we might say: Had he forced himself to recall his reasoning before acting, he might well have caught his own error and corrected it; and if he could not recall his reasoning, he would have needed to reasoned the decision anew and would likely have made a correct ruling. 
2. We would hope that people in positions of authority and power would be encouraged to rethink their decisions, and also to acknowledge their errors and correct them. Do you think Abaye’s case does either or both?
3. Could Abaye’s reason for allowing the High Priest in the hypothetical case to bring a chatat be that he is giving him the benefit of the doubt?