Halakhic Rabbit Hole (#1) — BT Yebamot 61b — #72

MISHNAH: No man may abstain from keeping the law, Be fertile and increase (Genesis 1:28), unless he already has children: According to the School of Shammai, [he is obligated to procreate until he has] two sons; according to the School of Hillel, a son and a daughter, for it is written, Male and female God created them (Genesis 5:2).

GEMARA: [We might infer from the mishnah that] if he has children, he may abstain from procreation, but he may not abstain from having a wife. This supports what Rav Nachman said in the name of Shmuel: “Even if a man has several children, it is forbidden for him to remain without a wife, as it says, It is not good that man should be alone (Genesis 2:18).” But others say [we might infer from the mishnah]: If he does have children, he may abstain from procreation and he may also abstain from [marrying] a wife. Shall we say that this is a conclusive refutation of what Rav Nachman said in the name of Shmuel? No: If a man has no children, he must marry a woman who can bear children; if a man has children, he may marry a woman who is not capable of bearing children.

INTRODUCTION

This is the first of several editions of TMT on a complex and troubling passage in the Talmud that, as we shall see in coming weeks, amounts to a halakhic rabbit hole.

Central to Jewish tradition is the notion of mitzvah, usually translated “commandment” or “religious obligation.” Torah is filled with mitzvot (pl.) that range from ethical to societal to ritual concerns. The Rabbis expanded the list substantially in numerous ways. For example, consider shabbat prohibitions. Torah lists four: Keep shabbat, sanctify  shabbat, refrain from work, and don’t light fires. Through their unique method of biblical hermeneutics, the Rabbis expand the work prohibition to include 39 melachot (categories) of activity, among them: sowing, plowing, reaping, kneading, baking, cleaning, spinning, tying a knot, sewing, tearing, writing, erasing, building, tearing down, kindling a fire, extinguishing a fire, and carrying. (There are 22 others.)

In the mishnah above, the Rabbis famously declare procreation to be a mitzvah. That alone should give us pause: What are the implications for people who cannot have, or do not want, children, and for those who have had, but lost, children?

COMMENTARY

On the basis of Genesis 1:28, the mishnah declares p’ru u-r’vu (“Be fertile and increase”) to be a positive commandment. In context, 1:28 is clearly descriptive: like all the living elements of  creation—plants and animals—human beings reproduce. Genesis 1:22 features the same words vis-a-vis land animals, but would anyone think that God commands them to reproduce? The Rabbis nonetheless choose to read 1:28 as prescriptive. Perhaps recognizing the inherent weakness of their claim, later in this daf and elsewhere, they support it by quoting Isaiah 45:18: …[God] formed [the earth] for habitation. The purpose of reproduction, then, is to fill the earth with civilization.

Having declared that procreation is a mitzvah from which a man may not abstain (the Rabbis will soon determine only men are obligated), the mishnah records a disagreement between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel concerning what is required to fulfill the mitzvah.

The Gemara infers from the mishnah that even if a man has children, he nonetheless must marry (e.g., if his wife died, he should remarry). The inference comes from what the mishnah does not say, viz. a man must be married unless he has children. This inference, Gemara tells us, is consistent with R. Nachman's teaching in the name of Shmuel. However, Shmuel based the requirement to be married on Genesis 2:18 and not on the proof text of this mishnah. This opens the door for an alternative opinion: Perhaps the inference that a man must marry is unnecessary? If the contention that a man does not have to marry (after having children) is correct, then it refutes what Shmuel taught (as conveyed by Rav Nachman).

The Rabbis have a dilemma: If they defend the first inference, they are requiring a man to marry even after having children. Certainly he may, but making it a requirement seems to lack justification. However, if they defend the second inference, they negate Shmuel’s teaching, which they seem loathe to do, perhaps because he led one of the two primary academies in Babylonia. Gemara’s solution is to read Shmuel’s teaching in a more nuanced way: Once a man has fulfilled his duty to have children, he may marry a woman who is unable to have children, but until then, he must marry a woman who can bear him children.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER AND DISCUSS

1. What are we to make of the disagreement between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel concerning what is required to fulfill the mitzvah of p’riya u-r’viya (procreation), given that it is biologically and mathematically meaningless, since by either criteria, the population will be approximately 50% male/50% female? What else may be of concern here?
2. What, if anything, does the Rabbis re-interpretation of Shmuel’s teaching resolve?
3. Why do you think the Rabbis insisted that Genesis 1:28 is prescriptive, rather than descriptive? I’ve mentioned some of the implications of Mishnah’s declaration that procreation is a mitzvah. Gemara sets minimums. Can you suggest further implications and problems that arise from this viewpoint? How do the situations you have envisioned inform you concerning the wisdom of the Rabbis’ decision?